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Book Review
Power Without Law: The Supreme CourtofCanada, the MarshallDecisions,
and the Failure of Judicial Activism by Alex M. Cameron. Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009. 244 pages.
Alex Cameron's book, Power Without Law, is a scathing critique of the
Supreme Court of Canada's 1999 decisions in R. v. Marshall' upholding
Donald Marshall Jr.'s Mi'kmaq treaty claim. Cameron's book has attracted
a lot of attention because of the author's position as Crown counsel for the
government of Nova Scotia. 2 Cameron was not involved as a lawyer in the
Marshall case itself. As a fisheries prosecution, Marshall was a matter of
federal jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867,1
and Nova Scotia chose not to intervene. However, Cameron did become
involved in a subsequent case dealing with the same series of treaties but
different accused, R. v. Stephen Marshall; R. v. Bernard,4 which involved
logging and was thus a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Cameron, who
had been a staff lawyer in the civil litigation section of the Nova Scotia
Department of Justice, was appointed as a Crown attorney (co-counsel) in
the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) for the purposes of the appeals in the
Stephen Marshall case. It was that involvement that brought Cameron to
the view that the Supreme Court of Canada had wrongly decided the 1999
Marshall case, (8) and ultimately to write the book.
I am certainly in no position to claim that Supreme Court. of Canada
decisions should be immune from criticism. Moreover, the Marshall case
has been subject to critique from multiple perspectives, for example in a
special issue of this journal,' and in an extensive comment from Donald
Marshall's counsel.' In this book review I do not hope to engage all the
issues the Marshall case raises, nor to address all the points that Cameron
1. R. v. Marshall (No. 1), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, application for rehearing dismissed in R. v. Marshall
(No. 2), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533. The full text.of Marshall (No. 1) is included as an Appendix to Cameron's
book. (152-213)
2. "N.S. lawyer's book critical of native-fishing ruling" CBC News (4 October 2009), online:
<http://www.cbc.calcanada/nova-scotialstory/2009/10/03/ns-book-treaty-rights.html> .
3. Constitution Act, 1867, Stats U.K. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
4. 2005 SCC 43, 2 S.C.R. 220. The Stephen Marshall case from Nova Scotia and the Bernard
case from New Brunswick were heard together in the Supreme Court of Canada, with a combined
judgment, since they raised identical issues.
5. "Forum on R. v. Marshall" (2000) 23 Dal. L.J. 5.
6. Bruce Wildsmith, "Vindicating Mi'kmaq Rights: The Struggle Before, During and After
Marshall" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 203.
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makes. Instead, the goal of this review is to propose that the thesis of
Cameron's book is fundamentally flawed.
The title of Cameron's book captures his underlying point, that there is*
no recourse against the Supreme Court of Canada, as the highest court of
appeal, if it makes a decision in disregard of the law, and refuses to correct
its errors. It is Cameron's contention that the Supreme Court of Canada did
just that in Marshall, contrary to fundamental constitutional principles,
undermining both the rule of law and democracy. (9) In support of this
view, Cameron addresses not only the role of courts but also the role of
lawyers appearing before courts.
In Marshall (No. 1) Justice Binnie, for the majority, held that Donald
Marshall had a valid treaty defence because "nothing less would uphold
the honour and integrity of the Crown in its dealings with the Mi'kmaq
people to secure their peace and friendship, as best the content of those treaty
promises can now be ascertained."' Cameron's book challenges that premise,
contending that there was no positive Mi'kmaq treaty right subsisting at the
time of the Marshall prosecution.
, Although the bulk of Cameron's book is about the Marshall decisions,
and the subsequent applications of them, he also makes brief commentary
on earlier cases. In particular, his assessment of the Supreme Court of
Canada's first decision interpreting s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,8 R.
Sparrow,' is that the "Court started badly." (35) He relies especially on the
Court's failure to distinguish between the "guaranteed" language of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'ocompared to the "recognized
and affirmed" language of s. 35(1), which Cameron assumes reflects less
stringent protection. (34) However, Cameron neglects to mention that s.
35(4) also uses the word "guaranteed."
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and
treaty rights referred to in subsection (I) are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons."
Cameron also asserts, without authority, that what is culturally significant
in a fishing case is the manner of fishing, not the reliance on the resource.
(34-35) Cameron characterizes the reasoning in Sparrow as "flawed," (34)
7. Supra note I at para. 4.
8. Section 35(1) reads:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed.
9. [1990] I S.C.R. 1075.
10. Part 1, Constitution Act 1982, Stats U.K. 1982, c. 11, Sch. B.
I1. Subsection (4) was added by the Constitution Amendment Pmclamation, 1983, 51/84-102, [emphasis
added].
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representing "an approach that fosters discord rather than native - non-
native reconciliation." (35) It is rather telling that Cameron assumes that a
narrow interpretation of Aboriginal rights is needed to avoid discord. He
is clearly approaching the interpretation exercise from a non-Aboriginal
perspective. He is on a very different wavelength than the Supreme Court
of Canada. 2
Cameron alleges that in Marshall (No. 1) Justice Binnie engaged
in improper judicial activism in reading in a treaty right without legal
foundation. Cameron's second chapter, entitled "Judicial Activism and Its
Critics," is standard, well-trodden territory. I agree with Greg Flynn" who
comments in his review of the book that Cameron's analysis of judicial
activism lacks "nuance and balance." 4
Cameron's underlying argument against the Supreme Court ofCanada's
majority decision in Marshall (No. 1) is that its treaty interpretation ignored
fundamental constitutional principles about the relationship between the
executive and the legislature, dating back to the Glorious Revolution of
1689, which embraced Parliamentary supremacy. Cameron contends that
the creation of a legislative assembly in the colony of Nova Scotia in 1758
constrained the treaty making powers of the British Governor. (18-20,
115-17)
Marshall (No. 1) concerned charges against Donald Marshall Jr. for
events in 1993 involving allegations of "three offences: the selling of eels
without a licence, fishing without a licence and fishing during the close
season with illegal nets."' 5 The only defence raised was a treaty defence,
which ultimately was confined to the 1760-61 treaties between the Mi'kmaq
and the British. The pertinent clause, which varied between the treaties only
with respect to the location of the truckhouse, reads as follows:
And I do further promise for myself and my tribe that we will not either
directly nor indirectly assist any of the enemies of His most sacred
Majesty King George the Second, his heirs or Successors, nor hold
any manner of Commerce traffick nor intercourse with them, but on
the contrary will as much as may be in our power discover and make
known to His Majesty's Governor, any ill designs which may be formed
or contrived against His Majesty's subjects. And I do further engage that
we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any Commodities in any manner
12. That is not meant to suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada's overall approach to the
interpretation of s. 35 is not itself overly restrictive in some respects. For a critique of Supreme Court
of Canada Aboriginal jurisprudence from a perspective diametrically opposed to Cameron's, see, for
example, John Borrows, "Uncertain Citizens: Aboriginal Peoples and the Supreme Court" (2001) 80
Can. Bar Rev. 15.
13. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University.
14. (2010) 53 (no. 2) Canadian Public Administration 289 at 291.
15. Supra note I at para. 62.
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but with such persons or the managers of such Truck houses as shall be
appointed or Established by His Maiesty's Governor at Lunenbourg or
Elsewhere in Nova Scotia or Accadia.A
On the face of the underlined portion of the clause, the only express treaty
provision is a negative covenant on the part of the Mi'kmaq. And, as
Cameron points out, the British Governor understood that such a negative
covenant could not be enforced against the Mi'kmaq without legislation
from the local assembly. (115) Justice Binnie referred to the brief history
of such legislation.
Accordingly, on March 21, 1760, the Nova Scotia House of Assembly
passed An Act to prevent any private Trade or Commerce with the
Indians, 34 Geo. II, c. 11. In July 1761, however, the "Lords of Trade
and Plantation" (the Board of Trade) in London objected and the King
disallowed the Act as a restraint on trade that disadvantaged British
merchants."
Cameron further asserts that, since there was no other legislation to
implement the treaty, there could have been no positive treaty right agreed
to by the Governor.
Justice Binnie concluded that the written treaty terms did not fully
represent the deal between the Mi'kmaq and the British. He relied on
negotiations between the British and the Maliseet and Passamaquody,
which he held were imported into the treaties with the Mi'kmaq. He
found:
My view is that the surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal
promise of a truckhouse, but a treaty right to continue to obtain
necessaries through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those
traditional activities subject to restrictions that can be justified under the
Badger test.'8
Cameron contends, in contrast to Justice Binnie's analysis, that the Crown
has no authority to determine trade rules by treaty without supporting
legislation. (19)
But it is one thing to make a treaty, and it is quite another to give it
effect. It has been the law for hundreds of years that rights, privileges,
or prohibitions in a treaty are of no effect - they are not law - without
legislation. (113)
16. Ibid. at para. 5 [emphasis added by Justice Binnie].
17. Ibid. at para. 33. In this context, the truckhouses fell into disuse within a few years, and the
substituted system of government licensed traders had fallen into disuse by 1780; ibid. at para. 6.
18. Ibid. at para. 56. Justification was not argued by the Crown in Marshall.
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However, Cameron leaves out an important qualifier, set out by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the landmark Labour Conventions
Case:
Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making
of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations,
if they entail alteration ofthe existing domestic law, requires legislative
action. 19
The negative covenant in the 1760 treaty, because it was a restriction not
previously recognized in colonial law, did require legislation to enforce
it. However, the positive right to gather and to trade that Justice Binnie
implied into the treaty, and that was the basis for Donald Marshall's
acquittal, was, in 1760, the right of all colonists in Nova Scotia. There
was then no need for implementing legislation because it did not change
the pre-existing law. Cameron is correct in saying that that the limitation
to "necessaries" that Justice Binnie read in could not have been enforced
against the Mi'kmaq without colonial legislation.20 (116, 123) However,
if there were no expectation that the Mi'kmaq would in fact seek to gather
and trade beyond the level of "necessaries" any time soon, there would
have been no urgency in bringing forth any such implementing legislation.
The key right that Marshall was relying upon was in substance, in 1760,
one shared with all colonists, but with a different status. Justice Binnie
emphasized this point.
The Crown objects strongly to any suggestion that the treaty conferred
"preferential trading rights". I do not think the appellant needs to show
preferential trading rights. He only has to show treaty trading rights.
The settlers and the military undoubtedly hunted and fished for sport
or necessaries as well, and traded goods with each other. The issue here
is not so much the content of the rights or liberties as the level of legal
protection thrown around them.2
The 1760-61 treaties made the Mi'kmaq British subjects at a time when
fishing and hunting were largely unregulated. Cameron notes that fishing
rights of Nova Scotia colonists could be traced back to the Magna.Carta.
(123) What Justice Binnie found was a treaty promise to the Mi'kmaq
to continue gathering and trading rights, even if, in future, broader
restrictions were placed on the general populace. Whether that treaty
promise would be honoured was, prior to 1982, entirely dependent on
19. [1937] A.C. 326 at para. 8 [emphasis added].
20. This point could be used to buttress Bruce Wildsmith's argument challenging Justice Binnie's
conclusion that the right was limited to "necessaries"; supra note 6 at 225.
21. Supra note I at para. 47.
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good will, based on Cameron's point-about Parliamentary supremacy. But
the significance of the entrenchment of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
is that, thereafter, constitutional supremacy regarding Aboriginal treaties
trumps Parliamentary supremacy. Cameron contends that Justice Binnie:
failed to note the very basic constitutional point that the treaty right he
discovered in 1999 by reference to discussion in 1760 could have no
legal effect in the intervening 239 years. That alone should have given
him pause. It is really not very plausible that the British agreed in 1760 to
give native peoples a treaty right that was neither legal nor enforceable.
(119-20)
However, the treaty right Justice Binnie found was, prior to 1982, legal
and enforceable so long as there was no inconsistent legislation. Donald
Marshall was charged under inconsistent federal fisheries legislation
which, after 1982, could be challenged as unconstitutional.
Cameron also contests the application of the March 10, 1760 treaty
with the LaHave Mi'kmaq to the later dealings with the Cape Breton
Mi'kmaq, based on evidence of a treaty signing ceremony at the Governor's
farm in Halifax on June 25, 1761. Cameron describes the speech of the
Cape Breton Chief as "the language of unconditional surrender." (100)
In a review of Cameron's book Andrew Nurse,2 2 a historian, criticizes the
historical accuracy of Cameron's "assumption that the word 'submission'
meant 'surrender."' 23 To buttress Nurse's point,' if unconditional surrender
were the real story, why would there have been need for any treaty at all?
Justice Binnie's underlying point is that, to be genuine treaties of peace
and friendship, the Mi'kmaq must have gotten something positive out of
them.
Cameron also says Justice Binnie's finding of a treaty right is
inconsistent with the minutes of a November 30, 1759 meeting of the
Nova Scotia Executive Council. Cameron notes that the "Maliseet chiefs
had sworn allegiance to the King and promised to live in peace. In other
words they surrendered." (96) In response the Executive Council advised
"a favourable reception, and an opportunity of extending their Trade, by
the establishment of Truckhouses amongst them, under such Regulations
as shall be agreed upon." (96) Cameron concludes that this document is
inconsistent with Justice Binnie's finding of a Maliseet "demand" two
months later. (98-9) According to Cameron, the Maliseet had already
surrendered, and were simply accepting a British proposal. (98) However,
if one assumes the swearing of allegiance was part of an on-going process
leading up to the conclusion of treaties, the minutes of the November
22. From the Center for Canadian Studies, Mount Allison University.
23. (2010) 36 Can. Pub. Pol'y 130 at 130.
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30, 1759 Council meeting can be seen as confirming Justice Binnie's
interpretation of the treaty. Beyond the purely negative covenant expressly
included in the treaty, the British were supportive of "extending" trade, i.e.
a positive covenant.
Justice Binnie's judgment in Marshall (No. 1) was written for an
audience oflawyers familiar with Aboriginal and treaty rightsjurisprudence.
Moreover, it showed little appreciation of its application beyond eels. And
it was clear that the federal government had no contingency plan for losing
Marshall in the Supreme Court of Canada. This was a recipe for trouble
arising out of disputed interpretations of what the case stood for, especially
in relation to the lobster fishery. This set the stage for Marshall (No. 2),24
in response to the application for a rehearing and stay by the West Nova
Fishermen's Coalition, an intervenor in Marshall (No. 1). Cameron is
on firmer ground in his critique of Marshall (No.2), (85-88) and there is
remarkable similarity in the comments of Cameron and Bruce Wildsmith,
as counsel for Donald Marshall.25 While purporting to. dismiss the
application for a rehearing and stay, the Supreme Court of Canada issued
extensive reasons in Marshall (No. 2). Although the written submissions
were only about the propriety of a rehearing and consequential stay, the
reasons for decision engaged the substance of the West Nova Fishermen's
Coalition's challenge to Marshall (No.]) and more. Marshall (No. 2) is
written for a wider audience, but it did much more than explain Marshall
(No. 1) to non-expert readers. In significant respects, it changed Marshall
(No. 1).26 Cameron accurately describes the impact of Marshall (No. 2).
"Still, the decision in Marshall (No. 1) was not overruled. It was merely
tempered." (88)
In the Marshall/Bernard case Chief Justice McLachlin claimed that the
"appellant Crown ... accepts Marshall 1 and 2".27 That was accurate in
respect of the New Brunswick Crown, but not the Nova Scotia Crown.
Cameron is understandably miffed and perplexed that the Supreme Court
of Canada misrepresented his position. (137-39) But there is no basis for
his apparent assumption that, if only the Supreme Court of Canada had
acknowledged his argument that Marshall (No. 1) was wrongly decided,
they would have had to agree with him. Cameron is right to say that the
Marshall/Bernard decision "substantially restricted its earlier decision
in Marshall (No .1)". (139) It should not be surprising that Chief Justice
24. Supra note 1.
25. Supra note 6 at 229-35.
26. Marshall (No. 2), supra note I at paras. 17, 38, confined the exercise of the treaty to each local
community (in which case Marshall should have been convicted since he was not fishing in his home
community), identified the treaty right as a collective right requiring community authorization (which
Marshall did not have), and introduced a new treaty qualifier of "equitable access."
27. Supra note 4 at para. 16.
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McLachlin, as a dissenter in Marshall (No. 1),28 would strive to limit its
precedential value. But it was unrealistic for Cameron to expect that the
Supreme Court of Canada would expressly overrule Marshall (No. 1).
In terms of the accountability of government lawyers, Cameron is
surprisingly inconsistent. On the one hand, he applauds the fact that an
inquiry from Nova Scotia Crown counsel set in motion a process that
ultimately resulted in New Brunswick Premier Bernard Lord directing
counsel for the New Brunswick Attorney General to remove a concession
from their draft Supreme Court of Canada factum in Bernard that Cameron
considered inappropriate.29 (136) On the other hand, Cameron extols the
virtues of the lack of political interference in Nova Scotia, owing to an arms
length Public Prosecution Service for which there is no New Brunswick
parallel.
By law, the PPS in Nova Scotia is independent of government. Politicians
and bureaucrats cannot dictate to prosecutors whether or how to prosecute
a case.. Prosecutors prosecute as they see fit, subject, of course, to legal
and ethical constraints, but entirely free of political influence. So the legal
arguments that would be advanced in the case would be my responsibility
jointly with the lawyer from the Appeal Section of PPS who was assigned
as my colleague in the appeal. Nova Scotia's position on native
treaty claims and native title claims would be based strictly on law
and evidence. No one would dictate to us the positions we would
argue. We alone would be responsible for the success or failure of
those positions. (8)
When it became known that Cameron's team would argue in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Stephen Marshall that the 1999 Marshall
case was wrongly decided, political pressure was applied.
Native chiefs in Nova Scotia petitioned the provincial Minister of Justice,
asking him to order that this argument not be made. ... [T]he Nova Scotia
Public Prosecution Service is effectively independent of the political
arena. As a result, the chiefs' petition went nowhere. (137)
It is accurate to say, as a matter of fact in the Stephen Marshall case,
that the "chiefs' petition went nowhere" (137) and that "[n]o one would
dictate to us the position we would argue." (8) However, as a matter of law,
Cameron is absolutely wrong in saying that "politicians ... cannot dictate
to prosecutors." (8) The Public Prosecutions Act expressly acknowledges
the power of the Attorney General to do so. Section 4 sets out the authority
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).
28. And the only judge to sit on both Marshall (No. 1) and Marshall/ Bernard.
29. The concession was "a treaty right, under the Halifax treaties, to be consulted and accommodated
in respect of New Brunswick's natural resources." (135-36)
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4 There shall be a Director of Public Prosecutions who
(b) may conduct all prosecutions independently of the Attorney General
except that the Director of Public Prosecutions shall comply with all
instructions or guidelines issued by the Attorney General in writing and
published pursuant to this Act; 0
Section 6 stipulates the power and duties of the Attorney General,
including authority, after consultation with the DPP, to issue instructions or
guidelines either generally' or in respect of particular prosecutions.32 The
important caveat is the requirement that these guidelines or instructions
are in writing and are published in the Royal Gazette.33 Thus the Attorney
General can indeed dictate, but not covertly. The website of the Public
Prosecution Service explains:
This procedure preserves the ultimate prosecutorial authority of the
Attorney General. This is a means of ensuring accountability to the
electorate for the manner in which public prosecutions are conducted.3 4
Written, . public instructions by the Attorney General are clearly
contemplated as extraordinary, but the option is a critical element ofpolitical
accountability. Indeed, prosecutions involving a claimed Aboriginal or
treaty rights defence might well be an appropriate occasion to invoke that
option. For example, if the government has negotiated an interpretation
of Aboriginal or treaty rights with Aboriginal representatives (either as a
final agreement or as an interim agreement pending further negotiations),
it would be incumbent upon the government to preclude prosecutions
inconsistent with the negotiated agreement. Given the legal position that
the honour of the Crown is always at stake," it cannot be the case that the
Crown lacks the capacity to ensure that its own understanding of honour
is upheld.
Dianne Pothier
Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University
30. S.N.S. 1990, c. 21, as am. by S.N.S. 1999 (2nd Sess.), c. 16, at s. 4 [emphasis added].
31. Ibid. at s. 6(a).
32. Ibid. at s. 6(b).
33. Ibid. at s. 6(b) contains a very limited exception where full publication is not required. This
exception is not relevant to the present discussion.
34. Public Prosecution Service, "PPS Independence" (23 April 2003), online: <http://wwwgov.
ns.ca/pps/independence.htm>.
35. R. v. Badger, [1996] I S.C.R. 771 at para. 41.
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